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Grill: The Public Use Limitation in Eminent Domain: Handley v. Cook

CASE COMMENTS
THE PUBLIC USE LIMITATION IN EMINENT

DOMAIN: HANDLEY V. COOK
The right of a citizen to his property is among the most important rights protected by the Constitution. It is the duty of the court
to be vigilant and to provide adequate safeguards to protect such
an important right. In Handley v. Cook' the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals further broadened the power of eminent
domain delegated to private corporations. As a result the interests
of landowners were diminished.
After having failed to reach an agreement with the private
landowners concerning rights-of-way over their lands, Appalachian
Power Company sought to condemn private property for the purpose of constructing a high voltage power transmission line to serve
the East Lynn Monterey Coal Company. The power company filed
condemnation proceedings in the Circuit Court of Wayne County.
The circuit court entered an order authorizing Appalachian Power
Company to survey and lay out the proposed rights-of-way. In
addition Appalachian Power Company was authorized to possess,
appropriate, and use the private property for the construction and
maintenance of an electric power transmission line.
The relators, Gene P. Handley et al., petitioned the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition in
which they alleged:2 (1) that the respondent power company had
exceeded its lawful powers of eminent domain by entering relators'
lands without their consent and prior to any court order, and further that the circuit court had exceeded its jurisdiction by entering
overbroad orders of entry for the purpose of survey; (2) that the
relators were effectively denied their day in court on the question
of the right of Appalachian Power Company to take their property;
(3) that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear the power
company's application to condemn because the power company
failed to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity;3
252 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1979).
2 Id. at 150 n.2.
W. VA. CODE § 54-2-2a (Cum. Supp. 1979) reads in its entirety:
In addition to the requirements set forth in section two [§54-2-2] of this
1

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1979

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 9
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

(4) that the lands sought to be condemned were not destined for
public use; and (5) that the circuit court lacked or otherwise exceeded its jurisdiction because Appalachian Power Company
failed to obtain a license from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in compliance with the National Historic Preservation Act
of 1966.1
When the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals agreed to
hear the case, it issued a rule to show cause which was limited to
two issues: "whether an order granting a right of entry for construction of a power line is appealable, notwithstanding the fact that
construction has not begun nor compensation been determined;
and, whether supplying electricity to a single mining operation is
a. public use contemplated by W. Va. Const. art. 3, § 9 and W. Va.
Code § 54-1-2(b) [1962]." 5
The court, in an opinion by Justice Neely, held that once an
order adjudicating the right to take has been entered in a condemnation proceeding, the property owners can seek a writ of error and
supersedeas even though the order is interlocutory in some respects. The court further held that condemnation of private property for the purpose of erecting an electric power transmission line
article, a public utility, person or corporation required under section
eleven-a, [§24-2-11al article two, chapter twenty-four of this Code to
obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the construction and location of a high voltage transmission line, shall file a certified
or attested copy of such certificate with its petition to condemn real or
personal property for the construction of such high voltage transmission
line. Failure to file such certified or attested copy of such certificate shall
result in dismissal of the petition.
16 U.S.C.A. § 470(0 (West Supp. 1979) reads in its entirety:
The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over
a proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking in any State and the
head of any Federal department or independent agency having authority
to license any undertaking shall, prior to the approval of the expenditure
of any Federal funds on the undertaking or prior to the issuance of any
license, as the case may be, take into account the effect of the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, or object that is included in
or eligible for inclusion in the National Register. The head of any such
Federal agency shall afford the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
established under sections 470i to 470n of this title a reasonable opportunity to comment with regard to such undertaking.
Neither the majority opinion nor the dissenting opinion discussed the relevance of
this statute to the facts of the case.
1 252 S.E.2d at 147.
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to a single commercial consumer serves a public use as contem7
plated by the West Virginia Constitution' and by statute. Thereupon the rule to show cause was discharged and the writ of prohibition denied.8
Justice McGraw dissented from the majority opinion citing
two mistakes made by the court. The first mistake was the court's
"unwise decision" to limit argument to two issues. By limiting the
argument Justice McGraw felt the court mistakenly ignored the
landowners' contention that the court below lacked jurisdiction to
adjudicate the power company's right to take because the power
company failed to file its application to condemn lands in compliance with the law, and such failure should have resulted in a dismissal of the petition. This mistake, according to Justice McGraw,
delayed justice and denied petitioners their constitutional rights.
The second mistake cited by Justice McGraw was the court's
refusal to consider the Amicus Curiae Brief prepared by two Pro9
fessors of Law of West Virginia University which, in the opinion
of Justice McGraw, "could have provided the Court with insight
into the origins of eminent domain and modern American law on
'public use.""'
The majority determined the threshold question in this case
VA. CONST. art. 3, § 9 reads in its entirety:
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use, without
just compensation; nor shall the same be taken by any company, incorporated for the purposes of internal improvement, until just compensation
shall have been paid, or secured to be paid, to the owner; and when
private property shall be taken, or damaged, for public use, or for the use

'W.

of such corporation, the compensation to the owner shall be ascertained

in such manner, as may be prescribed by general law; provided, that

when required by either of the parties, such compensation shall be ascer-

tained by an impartial jury of twelve freeholders.
W. VA. CODE § 54-1-2 (Cum. Supp. 1979) reads in pertinent part:
"The public uses for which private property may be taken or damaged are a:
follows:
'

(b) For the construction and maintenance of telegraph, telephone, electric light,
heat and power plants, systems, lines, transmission lines, conduits, stations (including branch, spur and service lines), when for public use; . ..
'

Handley v. Cook, 252 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1979).

Id. at 152. The text of the brief, prepared by Professors McGinley and Cady,
is included with the dissenting opinion as Appendix A.
11Id. at 151.
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to be whether a writ of prohibition was the proper procedure by
which to challenge the orders of the lower court. "It is well established that prohibition does not lie to correct mere errors"" and
cannot be substituted for a writ of error and appeal unless the
latter is an inadequate remedy. 2 The court noted that the lower
court had statutory jurisdiction 3 of the condemnation proceedings
unless it so exceeded its legitimate powers as to vitiate that jurisdiction. According to the majority opinion, the relators alleged
there was a vitiation of jurisdiction by the lower court's ruling that
condemnation of private property for construction of an electric
transmission line to a single commercial customer is a public use.
However, as pointed out by the dissent, relators actually alleged
that the failure of Appalachian Power Company to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity in accordance with section 24-2-11a of the Code should have resulted in a dismissal of
the condemnation petition as required by section 54-2-2a.' This
failure to dismiss the petition constituted the action by which the
relators contended the circuit court exceeded its legitimate powers
and acted without jurisdiction. 6 The majority opinion, for no apparent reason, makes no mention of this allegation; while, the
dissent cites this as the primary basis for the writ of prohibition.
The statutory requirement of a certificate of public conveni' Id. at 148 (citing Woodall v. Laurita, 156 W. Va. 707, 195 S.E.2d 717 (1973);
Huntington v. Lombardo, 149 W. Va. 671, 143 S.E.2d 535 (1965)).
12 Id.

W. VA. CODE § 54-2-1 (1966) reads in its entirety:
In any case in which property may lawfully be taken for a public use,
application may be made by petition to the circuit court or the judge
thereof in vacation, of the county in which the estate is situated, to
appoint commissioners to ascertain a just compensation to the owners of
the estate proposed to be taken. If a tract lies partly in one county and
partly in another, the application in relation thereto may be made in
either county.
" W. VA. CODE § 24-2-11a (1976 Replacement Vol.) reads in pertinent part:
(a) No public utility, person or corporation shall begin construction of a
high voltage transmission line of two hundred thousand volts or over,
which line is not an ordinary extension of an existing system in the usual
course of business as defined by the public service commission, unless
and until it or he shall have obtained from the public service commission
a certificate of public convenience and necessity approving the construction and proposed location of such transmission line.
See note 3 supra.
II 252 S.E.2d at 150.
"
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ence and necessity applies to construction of a high voltage transmission line of 200,000 volts or more. The transmission line proposed by Appalachian Power Company was characterized as having a potential capacity in excess of 200,000 volts." Whether the
statute applies to the potential capacity of the transmission line
or to the amount of voltage the power company asserts it intends
to supply at the present time is not clear since the statute does not
refer either to actual or potential voltage. If the statute is construed as applicable to specified rather than to potential voltage,
it appears the power company could at some later date step up the
voltage to 200,000 volts or more without invoking the statute. Since
the line would already have been constructed and would be the
extension of an existing system, the statute would not apply. The
statute, if not construed to include potential capacity of the transmission line, becomes virtually useless since power companies
could assert lesser voltage at the construction stage to avoid
complying with statutory requirements.
The relators' argument that Appalachian Power Company's
failure to comply with statutory requirements should have resulted
in dismissal of its petition speaks directly to the question of the
lower court's jurisdiction to hear this case. It would appear that by
ignoring this argument the court wanted to avoid the issue of
statutory construction as to potential or specified voltage. Obviously, this issue will arise whenever this statute is invoked.
Moreover, to ignore this argument is to ignore the primary basis
in Handley8 for seeking a writ of prohibition as opposed to a writ
of error. Does the court mean by its holding that once an order
adjudicating the right to take by eminent domain has been entered, the only remedy is a writ of error and supersedeas regardless
of the actions of the lower court? The answer to this question is
unclear. At one point in the opinion the court implied that if the
lower court so exceeded its legitimate power as to vitiate its jurisdiction, then prohibition would be a proper remedy. 9 However, at
a later point in the opinion the court stated that "[e]ven if relators' allegations were correct, prohibition would be an inappropriate means to challenge an adjudication of a private condemnor's
right to take because such orders are appealable final orders even
17Id.

252 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1979).
"Id. at 148.
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though they retain some characteristics of being interlocutory;
" I" Thus, the holding in this case leaves unanswered the question whether a writ of prohibition would ever be an appropriate
remedy in condemnation cases.
THE PuBuc-UsE LIMITATION
The proposition that private property cannot be taken for private use was not in dispute in Handley.2 The issue was whether
the use in this particular case, to supply electricity to a single
private corporation, was a public use." An understanding of this
issue requires a consideration of the meaning of the term "public
use." It has been stated that "[a] public use defies absolute definition, for it changes with varying conditions of society, new appliances in the sciences, changing conceptions of the scope and functions of government, and other differing circumstances brought
about by an increase in population and new modes of communication and transportation."2 The meaning of "public use" can only
be derived from an analysis of the historical influences which have
shaped it and from the social and political contexts of the cases
through which the meaning has evolved.
It has been suggested that the American Revolution was dedicated to the proposition that liberty and property are virtually
indistinguishable and that the proper function of government is to
protect both.Y The importance of private property is recognized in
the United States Constitution which provides that no person shall
"be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."2 The fourteenth amendment of the Constitution
prohibits the states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or
2
property, without due process of law. 1
" Id. at 149.
21 252 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1979).
22 The Amicus Curiae Brief prepared by Professors of Law McGinley and Cady
of West Virginia University discusses whether the proposed taking violates the
federal and state constitutions and state statutes by being for an essentially private
purpose. See note 9 supra.
23 Barnes v. City of New Haven, 140 Conn. 8, 15, 98 A.2d 523, 527 (1953).
24 Project, The Private Use of Public Power: The Private University and the
Power of Eminent Domain, 27 VAN-.L. Ray. 681 (1974).
2' U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
28 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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It is generally agreed that the provision, "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation" 2 in
the Constitution is a limitation on the federal government's power
of eminent domain rather than the source of that power. A constitutional government does not have the power to authorize the taking of an individual's property without his consent for the private
use of another; the taking of private property by eminent domain
must be for a public use. 21 Eminent domain is an inherent sovereign power of the federal government and, likewise, of all state
governments.2 9 "It is now well-settled in every state in the union
that the prohibition against the taking of property for the public
use without just compensation impliedly, but none the less definitely forbids a taking of property for private uses." 0
Unprecedented economic expansion in the early nineteenth
century resulted in the delegation of state power of eminent domain to private corporations to facilitate the developmeni of transportation and communication. The courts, not wishing to impede
progress, generally upheld the delegation of eminent domain powers and rejected the view of the landowners that the condemnations were for the purpose of furthering the corporate activities and
profits. The characterization of public use employed by courts to
differentiate such a use from a private use varied from where the
interest or even the expediency of the state was concerned to the
dominant view of where the project for which land was condemned
would benefit the public in some manner. This broad conceptualization of public use obscured the interests of landowners.3 '
In an effort to preserve the rights of landowners and in reaction to the liberal use of eminent domain, a stricter concept of
public use evolved in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The
stricter concept required a showing that the condemned land
would be open to use by the public as a matter of right. While the
eastern and midwestern states subscribed to this narrow definition
of "public use," the western states, which were experiencing a
delayed economic expansion, liberalized the meaning of public use
amend. V.

2' U.S. CONST.
2 Note, "Public

Use" As A Limitation On The Exercise Of The Eminent
Domain Power By Private Parties, 50 IowA L. Rlv. 799 (1965).
29Id.; See also Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
2A J. SACKMAN, NiCHOLS' THE LAW OF Em
'

rr DoMAN

§ 7.4

(3d ed. 1976).

Supra note 24.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1979

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 9

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

almost to the point of simple public expediency.2
The narrow "use by the public" criterion carried over into the
twentieth century but soon ran headlong into another period of
liberalization necessitated this time by urban renewal and slum
clearance programs. The view in this period was that when the
power of eminent domain is employed in conjunction with the
police power-the power of the sovereign to regulate private property for the public welfare-, it is necessarily for a public use.
"Public use" appeared to have become synonymous with "public
welfare." Although a few state courts define public use narrowly
as a matter of state constitutional law, it is generally agreed by
most commentators that the public use doctrine no longer imposes
a meaningful federal limitation on the exercise of eminent domain.3
The United States Supreme Court has consistently shown
great deference to state court decisions regarding public use. In
only one case has the Court found that the state exercise of eminent domain power was for a private use and in violation of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 4 Although the Court
has been generally reluctant to adopt a test for public use, it did
expressly repudiate the "use by the public test" in Mt. VernonWoodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co.3" In
Mt. Vernon-Woodberry a power company sought to condemn land
and water rights for its use in the manufacturing and selling of
hydroelectric power to the public. In repudiating the "use by the
public test" the Court stated:
In the organic relations of modem society it may sometimes be
hard to draw the line that is supposed to limit the authority of
the legislature to exercise or delegate the power of eminent domain. But to gather the streams from waste and to draw from
them energy, labor without brains, and so to save mankind from
32

Id.

3

Id.

Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896). A state agency
decision interpreting a statute as authorizing the agency to require a railroad to
grant a private individual the right to build a grain elevator on railroad land was
upheld by the state supreme court, but the United States Supreme Court held that
such a taking was for a private use and, therefore, unconstitutional. The Court did
not state what test it applied in reaching its decision. See also Berger, The Public
Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 ORE. L. REV. 203 (1978).
34Missouri

31 240 U.S. 30 (1916).
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toil that it can be spared, is to supply what, next to intellect, is
the very foundation of all our achievements and all our welfare.
If that purpose is not public we should be at a loss to say what
is. The inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal
6
test is establishedA3
37
the United States
In the landmark case of Berman v. Parker,
Supreme Court stated: "Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been
declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public
needs. . . ."1 Berman extended the fifth amendment's requirement of public use to encompass any taking that would further a
legitimate governmental policy and established the legislature's
power to determine what policies are in the public interest and
39
what programs constitute a public use.

Although the legislature, in the first instance, has the power
to determine the question of public use, whether the use for which
the legislature has authorized the taking of property by eminent
domain is really public is ultimately a judicial question." There is
a presumption that a use is public when the legislature has de4
clared it to be such, but this presumption is not conclusive. ' It is
the duty of the court to decide the issue of constitutionality. Although the use declared in the petition may be public and the
condemnation proceedings may appear to be regular on their face,
courts frequently look to extrinsic facts to determine the-actual
busiiness a corporation is planning to conduct and the necessity of
such business to the public.4"
The majority in Handley" sidestepped the question of the
meaning of "public use" and declined to establish a test or stan31Id. at 32.
37 348

U.S. 26 (1954).
Id. at 32.
3' Supra note 24.
112A J. SACKmAN, NICHoLS'THE LAW OF EMImNET DoMAIN § 7.4(1) (3d ed. 1976);
Shelton v. State Road Comm'n., 113 W. Va. 191, 167 S.E. 444 (1932).
" Pittsburgh R. Co. v. Benwood Iron Works, 31 W. Va. 710, 8 S.E. 453 (1888).
' Gauley & Summersville R. R. Co. v. Vencill, 73 W. Va. 650, 80 S.E. 1103
(1914). Where it appeared from extrinsic evidence that it was not really the purpose
of the petitioning railroad to serve the public but that the railroad was a creature
of a logging company, condemnation was denied.
13252 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1979).
3
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dards by which public use may be determined. Instead the court
reasoned that since Appalachian Power Company is a public service corporation, and since the legislature has declared the construction and maintenance of electric power transmission lines to
be a public use, then the construction' of an electric power transmission line by Appalachian Power Company to serve a customer
in this case is a public use. The court noted further that there is
no distinction between residential and commercial users, and that
it is the nature of the use and not the number of persons served
which is of paramount importance."
Other jurisdictions have held that service to a single customer
comes within the ambit of public use. However, there were other
factors in those cases which argued for the public benefit. For
example, in Exeter & Hampton Electric Co. v. Harding" the New
Hampshire court upheld a condemnation where the lines would fit
into a proposed master plan to provide a town with service and to
better serve anticipated future demands even though the transmission lines would serve but a single customer. In Montana Power
Company v. Bokmall where condemnation for the purpose of providing electric power and service to a single customer was allowed,
the Montana court required that before a court may order condemnation, it must find the proposed taking is necessary to the public
use in the individual case.
The West Virginia statute on which the court relied for its
declaration that the construction of power transmission lines is a
public use actually contains the term "public use(s)" in two different places. 7 Is the second use of the term merely redundant or does
it add to the interpretation of the provision? The court effectively
ignored the second use of the term in its decision, apparently considering it to be redundant. Careful examination of the statutory
language, however, supports the conclusion that the phrase "when
for public use" is a limitation on the power delegated by the statute. Indeed, the West Virginia court had previously noted in
CharlestonNatural Gas Co. v. Lowel8 that "when for public use"
" Id. at 149.

43105 N.H. 317, 199 A.2d 298 (1964).
153 Mont. 390, 457 P.2d 769 (1969).
' See note 7 supra.
" 52 W. Va. 662, 44

S.E. 410 (1901). Chapter 42, section 2 of the W. VA. CODE
(1899) read in pertinent part:
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qualified the right to condemn.
The phrase "when for public use" serves two functions with
respect to this statute. First, it serves as a limitation placed by the
legislature on the right of eminent domain. It emphasizes the fact
that not all "telegraph, telephone, electric light, heat and power
plants, systems, lines, transmission lines, conduits, stations" are
in and of themselves for public use, and only those which are
actually intended for public use will support condemnation. Second, this phrase implies that the decision as to whether a proposed
use is private or public is a matter for the courts. When the legislature attaches conditions to the exercise of the right of eminent
domain, whether the conditions have been met is a matter for
judicial inquiry."
The Amicus Curiae brief appended to the dissenting opinion
calls for rigorous judicial review of a utility company's right to
condemn because of the potential for abuse in the exercise of the
power of eminent domain by a non-public entity. The brief states
that "when the power of eminent domain is delegated to a private
entity, particularly one which is profit motivated, there is increased potential for abuse of discretion due to unavoidable conflicts of interest."5 This dichotomy between public and private
entities with respect to the power of eminent domain was recognized in West VirginiaBoard of Regents v. Fairmont,Morgantown
& PittsburghR. R.,1 1 where the court observed that the right of the
state to condemn is an attribute of sovereignty and is therefore
superior to the power of utilities to condemn, which power is
granted by the legislature. This dichotomy has long been recognized by the West Virginia court.2 In Varner v. Martin53 the court
The public uses for which private property may be taken or damaged, are
as follows:
Fifth-For companies organized for the purpose of transporting carbon
oil or natural gas, or both, by means of pipes or otherwise, when for public
use. Sixth-For telegraph and telephone companies, when for public use.
(1881).

*Baltimore& O.R.R. Co. v. Pittsburgh W. & Ky. R.R. Co., 17 W. Va. 812

Handley v. Cook, 252 S.E.2d 147, 156 app. (W. Va. 1979).
155 W. Va. 863, 189 S.E.2d 40 (1972).
52 See, e.g., Varner v. Martin, 21 W. Va. 534 (1883); Pittsburgh R. Co. v.
Benwood Iron Works, 31 W. Va. 710, 8 S.E. 453 (1888).
"

21 W. Va. 534 (1883).
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described the first class of condemnor as encompassing situations
where:
the property condemned is under the direct control and use of
the government or public officers of the government, or what is
almost the same thing in the direct use and occupation of the
public at large, though under the control of private persons or
of a corporation; . . .51

The court described the second class as encompassing situations
where there is:
direct use and occupation of private persons or of a corporation, and the general public has only an indirect and qualified
use of the property condemned, or perhaps no use properly of
any kind of the property condemned, but simply derives from
its use by and for a private person or corporation some indirect
advantage, as by the promotion of the general prosperity of the
community; . . .
Speaking of the second class, the Varner court stated:
It is obvious, that this entire class differ greatly from the first
class, of which we have spoken, and that unless carefully
guarded there is great danger, that the Legislature urged on by
a popular sentiment or claim would authorize private persons
or private corporations, claiming to come under this second
class, to condemn lands nominally for the public use, but really
for their own private use in violation of the rights of private
property, as designed to be protected by the Constitution. The
courts have therefore in such cases thrown around the owners
of private property safeguards, which we should be careful not
to permit to be broken down.5 6
The court in Varner enumerated three safeguards. First, the general public must have a definite and fixed use of the property to
be condemned. Second, this public use must be a clearly necessary
one for the public, that is, one which cannot be given up without
obvious general lass and inconvenience. Third, it must be at least
very difficult, if not impossible, to secure the same public uses and
purposes other than by the condemnation of private property."
" Id. at 552.
5 Id.
56Id. at 555-56.
Id. at 556.
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These safeguards have been cited many times as criteria for
determining public use." Among cases employing these criteria are
cases cited by the court in Handley59 to support the majority opinion. However, nowhere in the opinion did the court refer to any
criteria by which it judged whether a use is public or private. This
is unfortunate since the public need for the use and the consideration of alternatives to condemnation are criteria which, in the
minds of most, would separate a legitimate exercise of the power
of eminent domain from an illegitimate one.6"
It is time for the courts to rigorously scrutinize allegations of
public use in order to protect the property rights of private individuals. The constitution asks no more, but demands no less.
Donna P. Grill
I

Carnegie Natural Gas Co. v. Swiger, 72 W. Va. 557, 79 S.E. 3 (1913); Hench

v. Pritt, 62 W. Va. 270, 57 S.E. 808 (1907); Charleston Natural Gas Co. v. Lowe,
52 W. Va. 662, 44 S.E. 410 (1901).
5, 252 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1979).
60 Id.
at 152. In Handley, there was an allegation that electric service already

existed.
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